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Abstract
Objective: Though healthcare is often exhorted to learn from ‘high-reliability’ industries, adopting
tools and techniques from those sectors may not be straightforward. We sought to examine the
hierarchies of risk controls approach, used in high-risk industries to rank interventions according
to supposed effectiveness in reducing risk, and widely advocated as appropriate for healthcare.
Design: Classiﬁcation of risk controls proposed by clinical teams following proactive detection of
hazards in their clinical systems. Classiﬁcation was based on a widely used hierarchy of controls
developed by the US National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH).
Setting and participants: A range of clinical settings in four English NHS hospitals.
Results: The four clinical teams in our study planned a total of 42 risk controls aimed at addressing
safety hazards. Most (n = 35) could be classed as administrative controls, thus qualifying among
the weakest type of interventions according to the HoC approach. Six risk controls qualiﬁed as
‘engineering’ controls, i.e. the intermediate level of the hierarchy. Only risk control qualiﬁed as
‘substitution’, classiﬁed as the strongest type of intervention by the HoC.
Conclusions: Many risk controls introduced by clinical teams may cluster towards the apparently
weaker end of an established hierarchy of controls. Less clear is whether the HoC approach as cur-
rently formulated is useful for the speciﬁcs of healthcare. Valuable opportunities for safety
improvement may be lost if inappropriate hierarchical models are used to guide the selection of
patient safety improvement interventions. Though learning from other industries may be useful,
caution is needed.
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Introduction
Health systems globally continue to experience high human burden
[1] and economic costs [2] associated adverse events, yet the search
for improved safety has remained elusive. Healthcare is increasingly
exhorted to learn from industries, such as aviation and nuclear
energy, that have achieved high reliability despite operating in haz-
ardous contexts [3–5]. As a result, tools and procedures used in
other sectors are now often deployed in healthcare settings,
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including a range of techniques to identify hazards and risks.
Examples of approaches adapted from other industries include root
cause analysis of safety incidents, which is now widely used in
healthcare [6]. Proactive structured risk assessment tools (such as
failure modes and effects analysis) are now also found, though less
commonly [7, 8].
Once hazards have been identiﬁed, of course, organizations need
to introduce risk controls to mitigate or eliminate risk of harm. In
the safety literature, the concept of a hierarchy of risk controls
(HoC) has gained in popularity [9–11]. The deﬁning characteristic
of the HoC approach is that it ranks risks controls according to the
presumed degree of effectiveness in reducing risk [9–11], thus seek-
ing to inform optimal choice of safety improvement strategies. Most
variants of the HoC are based on three basic principles [10–13]. The
ﬁrst is that safety incidents occur as a result of exposure to particu-
lar hazards, implying that risk controls that eliminate the underlying
hazard(s) are most likely to be effective [11, 12]. Second, HoCs are
based on the assumption that humans are fallible. Accordingly, risk
controls that rely on ‘hard stops’ and forcing functions—and thus
minimize reliance on human behaviour—are seen as more effective
on grounds that they reduce the chance for human error [13]. Third,
the HoC approach is founded in the assumption that risk controls
that are higher in the hierarchy are likely to be harder, on average,
to design and implement [12, 13]. HoCs characteristically classify
instructional or administrative solutions (like training or rewording
of policies) as weak because they are thought to address only the
symptoms of more institutionally engrained problems rather than
the true causes.
The HoC approach has, like other techniques from high-risk
industries, been widely advocated in healthcare. The National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) HoC [13]
(Fig. 1) has been widely adopted and inﬂuential in health systems
globally [14–20]. Consistent with the basic principles underlying
HoCs, the NIOSH model ranks risk controls such that, e.g. product
redesign is considered a stronger and more desired action than
training.
When applied in a healthcare context, the available literature
indicates that administrative controls, which are ranked among the
weakest by NIOSH and other HoCs, remain among the most com-
monly proposed solutions to hazards [21, 22]. For example, a recent
systematic review that used a simpliﬁed version of the NIOSH hier-
archy [11] to classify risk controls in studies of root cause analysis
in healthcare found that only 3.3% could be classiﬁed as elimination
measures (strong) and that most (78%) of controls were adminis-
trative in nature. This review concluded by expressing concern
that some of the most widely used risk control strategies in health-
care, such as training and education, ‘might do more harm than
good’ [11].
Most studies to date have been conducted in the context of root
cause analyses of known incidents; it is possible that more proactive
approaches to hazard and risk detection might stimulate a different
range of risk controls. Examination of risk controls introduced by
clinical teams following proactive risk detection affords an oppor-
tunity to revisit the HoC approach and reﬂect on its appropriateness
for healthcare, and is the task to which this article is addressed.
Methods
We examined 42 risk controls that were planned by clinical teams in
four NHS hospitals in England and Scotland. All of the teams had
been trained in and were using an approach known as Safer Clinical
Systems, between 2014 and 2016.
The Safer Clinical Systems approach was developed by a team at
the University of Warwick with funding from the Health
Foundation, an independent charitable foundation. The approach
aims to support the delivery of safe and reliable healthcare based on
learning from a range of hazardous industries and literatures,
including high reliability organizations, risk management techniques
and quality improvement methods. Safer Clinical Systems involves
applying a speciﬁc set of tools and techniques—such as Failure
Modes and Effects Analysis and Hierarchical Task Analysis—to
local clinical systems and pathways to proactively diagnose hazards
and then implementing risk control interventions to address these
hazards. The approach involves four steps: (i) pathway deﬁnition
and context; (ii) system diagnosis; (iii) option appraisal and planning
interventions/risk controls and (iv) system improvement cycles
involving implementation, revision of interventions and measure-
ment of outcomes. A programme to test and develop the Safer
Clinical Systems approach was conducted between 2011 and 2016,
working with hospital sites around the UK. The Health Foundation
sponsored an independent evaluation of the programme [23], on
which this study is based.
Each site participating in the programme appointed a multidis-
ciplinary team of clinicians with protected time for the programme.
Between 2014 and 2016, a period known as the extension phase,
the programme involved six sites and focused on understanding the
extent to which clinical teams were using the Safer Clinical Systems
approach to develop effective risk controls. Sites were expected to
develop a set of risk controls and generate an implementation plan
based on the previous diagnostic phases. Of the six sites, four imple-
mented a set of risk controls as part of their Safer Clinical Systems
activities and are the focus of our study. The remaining two sites did
not progress to developing risk controls during the programme.
Of the four sites that implemented risk controls, two aimed to
improve the prompt recognition and treatment of two high-risk con-
ditions (sepsis and venous thromboembolism (VTE), respectively).
The two other sites focused on improving medication safety. All
teams included doctors and nurses from different medical specialties;
two also included pharmacists. Appendix 1 provides a summary of
the diagnostic activities undertaken by each site, the identiﬁed
hazards and the risk controls (interventions aimed at improving
safety) that were implemented to address these hazards.
We classiﬁed the safety interventions implemented within each of
the four projects according to the ﬁve-tiered HoC proposed by
Figure 1 Hierarchy of control. Source: National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Applied Research and Technology.
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NIOSH [13]. Two authors (E.L. and M.F.P.) independently assigned
the interventions to the HoC, achieving 85.7% agreement on the
categorization. Discrepancies were settled through discussion and
the third author (M.D.W.), reaching 100% consensus on the
categorization.
Results
Between them, the four Safer Clinical Systems teams proposed 42
risk controls, which they developed following diagnosis of hazards
along their respective clinical pathways. Table 1 organizes the risk
controls into common themes and classiﬁes them according to the
NIOSH hierarchy of control. As shown in Fig. 2, the majority of
risk controls clustered at the bottom of the hierarchy.
Only one of the risk controls we examined—new pumps for
VTE mechanical prophylaxis—qualiﬁed as ‘substitution’ (among the
strongest type of risk control, according to the NIOSH hierarchy).
The diagnostic work at the site where this risk control was intro-
duced had revealed that three different forms of mechanical prophy-
laxis were in use in different parts of the hospital, and the chosen
risk control was to replace old devices with a new, standardized
one.
Six risk controls qualiﬁed as ‘engineering’ controls (the inter-
mediate level of the HoC). An example was prescribing software
that required a pharmacist to check a prescription before it was
released.
The vast majority of the interventions (35 out of 42) qualiﬁed as
administrative controls and would thus be deemed ‘weak’ according
to the NIOSH hierarchy. This category included a highly heteroge-
neous group of safety actions. Ten interventions were changes in the
organization and delivery of ward-based care, such as the
introduction of new ways of organizing medical notes. Ten others
included actions aimed at formalizing roles and responsibilities and
improving the use of skill mix. These included, for example, introdu-
cing ward champions or increasing the number of hours a pharma-
cist could spend on a ward. Three interventions were based on
training. Finally, three aimed at improving communication via struc-
tured handovers and formal meetings.
Discussion
Our study suggests that if a hierarchy of control model adapted
from high reliability industries is applied to risk controls introduced
by clinical teams in response to proactive identiﬁcation of hazards in
their clinical pathways, most risk controls would be deemed ‘weak’
[9]. These ﬁndings are largely consistent with previous analyses of
risk controls implemented following retrospective root cause ana-
lyses, suggesting that a proactive hazard detection approach does
not result in a distinctive pattern of risk controls [11]. While one
interpretation is that healthcare organizations are simply very poor
at generating risk controls, these ﬁndings raise the question of
whether a hierarchical approach to risk controls is appropriate for
the speciﬁcs of healthcare. We suggest that the ability of the HoC
approach to predict the success or failure of risk controls in clinical
settings is challenged by three issues.
First, the HoC approach tends to categorize interventions based
only on superﬁcial and visible characteristics, without sufﬁcient
attention to the heterogeneity of risk controls and the quality of the
design, delivery and intervention. For example, ‘training’ features as
a self-contained category in the HoC and is classed a weak action.
Yet education, training and behaviour change interventions can be
delivered in multiple different formats, ranging from didactic
Table 1 Description and categorization of the 42 risk controls proposed by four Safer Clinical Systems teams
Category Examples Number HoC category
Introduction of new equipment to substitute
inappropriate/hazardous ones
Substitution of the pumps for venous thromboembolism (VTE)
mechanical prophylaxis
1 1 Substitution
(Strong action)
Introduction of new pieces of technology to
improve complex working activities
Introduction of an electronic system for medicine reconciliation 5 6 Engineering
control
(intermediate
action)
Forcing functions Introduction of a computerized prescribing software that required a
pharmacist to check a prescription before it was released
1
Changes in the design and/or organization
of ward care
• Creation of a ‘sepsis trolley’ to ease clinicians’ access to relevant
equipment
• Reduction of noise and disturbance during key processes
10 35 Administrative
control (weak
action)
Formalizing roles and responsibilities,
effective use of skill mix, restructuring
working shifts
• Introduction of senior nursing support on the shop ﬂoor
• Introduction of ward champions
10
Standardization of key processes and
procedures
• Standardization of VTE risk assessment according to NICE
guidelines
3
Improvement of communication via
structured handovers and formal
meetings
• Implementation of a twice daily ‘pre-brief’ to improve
multidisciplinary communication
3
Training • Training for all nursing staff on the presentations, screening tools,
and atypical presentations of sepsis
3
Cross-checking and safety monitoring • Introduction of a pharmacist on the ward to check medicine
reconciliation and, on ﬁnding a discrepancy, instructs the person
responsible and talks him/her through the error
2
Patients’ input • Patient survey on their perception of medicine reconciliation 2
Rewards systems for best performances • Introduction of a poster or noticeboard that shows, monthly, which
employer performed best in selected safety-critical tasks
1
Others 1
Total 42
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approaches to immersive group-based simulations: they are not one
thing, nor are their impacts equal [24]. Training is a key feature of
some important and successful healthcare improvement programmes
[25]. Training outcomes can span from enhancing technical knowl-
edge to improving motivation, nurturing a safety culture, or devel-
oping new communities of practice [24, 26, 27]. Describing training
merely as an action at the level of an ‘administrative control’ is thus
reductive and misleading [28, 29]. More broadly, some risk controls
deemed ‘weak’ under a HoC model (e.g. the redesign of teams or
the introduction of structured communication strategies) are some-
times shown to be highly effective when they are targeted to speciﬁc
groups of clinical staff, trigger experiential learning and exploit the
‘natural networks’ of healthcare [24, 30]. Valuable opportunities for
tackling persistent challenges to healthcare safety, such as poor
teamwork and communication between different disciplines [31],
may be lost if healthcare contexts were to discard these
interventions.
Second, HoCs do not take into account the ﬁt between the iden-
tiﬁed hazards and the planned interventions, thus tending to assume
that interventions will operate in the same way regardless of context.
Insufﬁcient attention is granted by the HoC approach to the degree
of ‘congruence’ between a risk control and its target. This is prob-
lematic, because risk controls that rely heavily on human behaviours
may feature lower in the HoC hierarchy, but may be highly impact-
ful if designed to be congruent with the identiﬁed risks and imple-
mented with a rigorous theory-of-change [32–34].
Third, a hierarchy-based approach may have little to offer to our
understanding of the social and organizational factors that contrib-
ute to the success or failure of safety interventions in healthcare.
Risk controls are created by two intertwined elements: the ‘content’
of the interventions (the core corrective action that is thought to
reduce risk) and the supportive/facilitative factors that make it pos-
sible for the intervention to be implemented in speciﬁc organiza-
tional contexts [35]. Such factors include high-level organizational
and managerial sponsorship, teams’ ability to engage inﬂuential clin-
icians, and the professional legitimization of the proposed risk con-
trols. HoCs only account for the content element of risk controls:
they do not describe how interventions are carried out nor how they
become embedded and sustained over time. Moreover, since the HoC
tends to conceptualize risk controls in a direct and mechanistic way, it
may fail to capture the non-linear, indirect and longer-term outcomes
of ‘weaker’ forms of risk controls, such as cultural change [36].
Though some features of the hierarchy of controls approach may
be relevant to healthcare (e.g. its use as a structured brainstorming
technique [37]), we propose that the straightforward application of
this model adds little value to the development of effective risk con-
trols in clinical settings, and lacks validity and usefulness. A better
option may be to adopt models that categorize risk controls but do
not imply a hierarchy. Vincent and Amalberti [26], e.g. have identi-
ﬁed a typology of risk controls that includes ﬁve safety strategies,
each of which includes different interventions. This model is not
hierarchical; it does not imply that interventions can be strong or
weak per se. Rather, the effectiveness of a strategy depends on the ﬁt
(‘congruence’) between the features of the local contexts and the
interventions put in place. For example, in settings where care can
be precisely deﬁned, delineated strategies to control exposure to risk
and maintain standards are the most suitable and promising
approaches. In contrast, in more ﬂuid and dynamic environment,
strategies to improve monitoring and adaptation may be preferred.
This approach suggests that evaluation of risk controls should
include assessment of the congruence between hazards and interven-
tions, and the process and mechanisms through which interventions
are expected to accomplish the desired outcome. It also suggests a
need to ensure that the interventions are both comprehensive and
speciﬁc enough to target the identiﬁed risks [32]; this is essential to
secure the cost-effectiveness of the selected risk controls, i.e. to avoid
implementing costly and complex interventions when cheaper and
simpler options are available and equally effective [2]. A sound link
between hazards and risk controls—i.e. a clearly outlined theory of
change—is key for successful safety intervention [24, 32, 33]. In the
absence of a theoretical explanation of the mechanisms through which
they address speciﬁc hazards, it makes little sense to make a priori jud-
gements about the effectiveness of a risk control and a hazard.
Some existing studies are making promising moves in this direc-
tion. Manuele [9], for instance, has suggested integrating the HoC
into a structured decision-making strategy. If, e.g. a hazard is caused
by individuals lacking knowledge of speciﬁc clinical procedure, then
training and education operating at the individual-/team-level may
be more effective than engineering controls operating at the infra-
structure level. Similarly Card et al. [37] suggest using HoCs as a
cognitive aid to supporting the formulation of risk controls. The
authors propose a structured brainstorming technique (Generating
Options for Active Risk Control—GO-ARC) in which a series of
prompts are used to elicit risk control options after a formal risk
assessment. Each prompt overlaps with a risk control strategy. This
tool was shown to improve the quantity, and variety of risk control
options generated. Further evaluation of such tools is needed.
Conclusion
Assessment of risk controls should be based on the ﬁndings of
empirical research and good theory about how to make improve-
ments in healthcare, rather than rigid adoption of a hierarchical
approach borrowed from other industries. The complexity of health-
care organizations, and their inherent reliance on human behaviour,
interactions and knowledge, indicates that the mere duplication of
ideas from other ﬁelds—even when they are deemed ‘high reliability’—
may turn out to be ineffective, if not harmful. Rigid or unreﬂective
application of the HoC approach in healthcare could mislead those
seeking to improve patient safety. Introducing new tools and proce-
dures should not be conceived in isolation from healthcare’s broader
organizational context and unique features [38, 39]; achieving high
reliability is more likely to occur if the adoption (and adaptation) of
Administrative
Controls
Engineering Controls
Substitution
N = 6
N = 1
N = 35
Figure 2 Distribution of interventions classiﬁed according to the NIOSH hier-
archy of risk controls.
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tools from other industries is combined with deep insights into the
speciﬁc context of healthcare [39].
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